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Criminal Law Practitioner
DO THE FEDERAL COURTS SWEEP BUIE(LEAN?
by Jeffrey T Wennar
The development of exceptions to the
Foir1h \mendment's warrant requirement
repre it ai balance between safety and pri-
vacy. Often they are designed to grant arrest-
ing police officers an opportunity to secure a
person, area, or items that represent a threat
to the individual officer or public. Alternately,
these exceptions can be viewed as an encroach-
ment on individual rights that enable police to
skirt the Fourth Amendment. Over the years,
the United States Supreme Court and federal
circuits have emphasized that searches and sei-
zures outside the narrow exceptions are pre-
sumptively invalid. While many articles and
analyses of these exceptions review the incen-
tives, impacts, and influences these exceptions
have on criminal procedure, the words used by
federal courts have become increasingly indica-
tive of a permissive approach to criminal proce-
dure. This article reviews those developments
with particular attention to verbiage used by
courts in applying the decision Maryland v. Buie
and the underlying rationale for the "protective
sweep" exception to the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable search-
es and seizures, shall not be violat-
ed, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be
seized.'
A point of departure for any understanding
of the Fourth Amendment was established in
Coolidge . New Hampshire when the Supreme
Court held that " [t]he most basic constitution-
al role in this area is that 'searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior ap-
proval by judge or magistrate, are per se unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment sub-
ject only to a few specifically established and
well defined exceptions."2
Over the years the Supreme Court has
recognized certain exceptions to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment includ-
ing: searches incident to arrest; automobile
searches;4 the plain view exception;5 the inven-
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971)
(citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
3 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969)
abrogation recognized by Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419
(2011) (implying that in the absence of a warrant, a warrantless
Fourth Amendment search may be valid if confined to the
immediate person and area in which an arrested suspect may
have obtained a weapon or something that could be used as
evidence against him).
4 See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)
(holding with regard to the search of accused's car, "[t]he
blue station wagon could have been searched on the spot
when it was stopped since there was probable cause to search
and it was a fleeting target for a search ... In that event
there is little to choose in terms of practical consequences
between an immediate search without a warrant and the car's
immobilization until a warrant is obtained").
5 See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467-68 (noting that the
plain-view doctrine does not run afoul of Fourth Amendment
Fall 2013 Washington College of Law 59
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tory exception;6 the consent exception;, Terry
stops;" the abandoned property exception;'
the hot pursuit exceptionlo or the exigent cir-
cumstances exception;" the community-care-
taking exception;1 the suitcase or container
exception;" and the protective sweep excep-
requirements in that such a search is made only incident to a
lawful search or some other lawful law enforcement activity,
and that the scope of such a search is inherently narrow and
does not expand into a general or exploratory search).
6 See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375-76
(1976) (holding a search of an impounded car did not violate
the Fourth Amendment when such search occurred incident
only to the taking of inventory of the contents of the vehicle).
7 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49
(1973) (holding that when a suspect is not in custody, a search
will not violate the Fourth Amendment if it is voluntarily
consented to in the absence of duress or coercion).
8 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (holding
that there is no Fourth Amendment violation where, "a
police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing
in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for
the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him").
9 See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960)
(noting that there was no Fourth Amendment violation when
hotel management consented to an FBI search of the room
after a suspect abandoned property in a hotel room trash can
and checked out of the hotel).
10 See Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) (commenting "[t]here
are exceptions to this [warrant] rule. Searches may be made
incident to a lawful arrest, and-as today's decision indicates-
in the course of 'hot pursuit"').
11 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978)
(citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948))
(noting that "warrants are generally required to search a
person's home or his person unless 'the exigencies of the
situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling
that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment").
12 See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447-48 (1973)
(holding that searches conducted in the course of an officer's
caretaking duties are not facially unreasonable in the absence
of a warrant).
13 See generally United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1, 14-15 (1977) abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565 (1991) (recognizing that warrantless searches of luggage
tion.14 The following text surveys the current
status of protective sweeps throughout the fed-
eral circuits.
I. The Buie Decision
In Maryland v'. Buie, a Godfather's pizza
restaurant in Prince George's County, Mary-
land was robbed by two men? One of the rob-
bers wore a red running suit. The police de-
veloped Jerome Edward Buie as a suspect and
subsequently obtained a warrant for his arrest
and that of his accomplice. The warrant for
Buie was executed at his residence, and Buie
was arrested as he emerged from the basement
of the home. After the arrest an officer entered
the basement "in case there was someone else
[there]," and in doing so, the officer observed
the red running suit in plain view and he seized
it.16
Buie made a motion to suppress the red
running suit prior to trial, which the trial court
denied., On appeal to the intermediate appel-
late court, the trial judge's ruling was affirmed.
The Maryland Court of Appeals subsequently
reversed the Court of Special Appeals hold-
ing that the running suit was inadmissible as
the state failed to satisfy the probable cause
requirement. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and framed the issue
as one of determining "what level of justifica-
tion the Fourth Amendment required before
[the detective] could legally enter the basement
to see if someone else was there."" The Court
acknowledged that until the moment Buie was
arrested "the police had the right, based on the
authority of the arrest warrant, to search any-
where in the house that Buie might have been
found, including the basement."19
may be conducted, so long as the search occurs incident to an
arrest, or there is an exigent circumstance).
14 See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1990)
(holding that to require a warrant for a protective sweep would
be an unnecessarily strict Fourth Amendment standard).
15 Id. at 328.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 330.
19 Id.
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Justice White, writing for the majority,
analogized Terry . Ohio and Michigan . Long
to the case at hand. With regard to Terry, Jus-
tice White noted:
[We held that an on-the-street
"frisk" for weapons must be tested
by the Fourth Amendment's gen-
eral proscription against unreason-
able searches because such a frisk
involves "an entire rubric of police
conduct- necessarily swift action
predicated upon the on-the-spot ob-
servations of the officer on the heat-
which historically has not been, and
as a practical matter could not be,
subjected to the warrant procedure.
Similarly as it related to Long, Justice White re-
flected:
[T]he search of the passenger com-
partment of an automobile, limited
to those areas in which a weapon
may be placed or hidden, is permis-
sible if the police officer possesses a
reasonable belief based on "specific
and articulable facts which, taken
together with the rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably war-
rant" the officer in believing that the
suspect is dangerous and the sus-
pect may gain immediate control of
weapons.2 2
Justice White noted that "[t]he ingredi-
ents to apply the balance struck in Terry and
Long are present .... Possessing an arrest war-
rant and probable cause to believe Buie was
in his home, the officers were entitled to enter
and to search anywhere in the house in which
Buie might be found."21 The Court further ac-
20 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983)
(holding that "the balancing required by Terry clearly weighs
in favor of allowing the police to conduct an area search of the
passenger compartment to uncover weapons, as long as they
possess an articulable and objectively reasonable belief that the
suspect is potentially dangerous").
21 Buie, 494 U.S. at 331-32 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
22 Buie, 494 U.S. at 332 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. at 1049-50).
23 Id. at 332-33.
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knowledged the risk of officers' safety in the
home and found "[it] is as great as, if not greater
than, it is in an on-the-street or roadside inves-
tigatory encounter."24 The Court's rationale for
this safety risk was due in large part to being
an officer's disadvantage of on his "adversary's
turf.'2
The Court limited the search "as an
incident to the arrest the officers could, as a
precautionary matter and without probable
cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets
and other spaces immediately adjoining the
place of arrest from which an attack could be
launched."6 The Court then went on to place
further restrictions on what officers could do
beyond a precautionary sweep noting, "just as
in Terry and Long, there must be articulable
facts which, taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts, would warrant a
reasonably prudent officer in believing that the
area to be swept harbors an individual posing
a danger."2 The Court cautioned, however, that
such a sweep is not the equivalent of a search;
it must be swift and last only long enough to
dispel any reasonable suspicion of danger.
Further, a protective Buie sweep is a
more limited intrusion than that articulated in
Chimel. California.28 Unlike a Chimel search, al-
lowing the immediate area of the arrestee to be
searched, which is essentially automatic, a Buie
sweep may only be conducted "when justified
by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
house is harboring a person posing a danger to
those on the arrest scene."29 Thus, the underly-
ing rational for the protective sweep doctrine is
the principle that police officers should be able
to ensure their safety when they lawfully enter a
private dwelling.o The officer must have a rea-
24 Id. at 333.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 334.
27 Id.
28 See generally Buie, 494 U.S. at 336 (distinguishing the
facts of Chimel from those of Buie).
29 Id.
30 Leaf v. Shelnutt, 400 E3d 1070, 1087 (7th Cir. 2005)
(quoting United States v. Burrows, 48 E3d 1011, 1015-16 (7th
Cir. 1995)).
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sonable suspicion of danger.,1 For an officer to
harbor a reasonable suspicion of danger there
must be "articulable facts, which taken together
with the rational inferences from those facts,
would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in
believing that the area to be swept harbors an
individual posing a danger to those on the ar-
rest scene.",2
II. Articulable Suspicion
The circuit courts differ on what cir-
cumstances are constitutionally sufficient to
justify a Buie sweep. In UnitedStates (. Winston,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals was present-
ed with an interlocutory appeal from the gov-
ernment regarding the District Court of Mas-
sachusetts' suppression of evidence holding
that the Buie doctrine had been violated. The
circuit court addressed the facts known to the
agents:
First, the agents had information to
believe that Winston was armed and
dangerous and possibly with armed
cohorts. Winston was indicted,
along with twenty-five others, for
distribution of cocaine as part of an
investigation of a large-scale cocaine
trafficking organization. One of the
other defendants informed agents
that he had sold Winston two hand-
guns and a bullet-proof vest. One
of the agents present had also previ-
ously arrested Winston after a traf-
fic stop for possession of a handgun.
Second ... that Winston's girlfriend
initially denied having knowledge of
Winston's car."34
In reversing and remanding the case, the
majority of the court held that the agents had
the right to protect themselves from Winston
and other circumstances "reasonably within
the scope of the dangers they were facing, i.e.,
31 See generally Buie, 494 U.S. at 335-36 (inferring
the need for a reasonable suspicion of danger to exist before
conducting a sweep).
32 Id. at 334.
33 444 E3d 115,116 (1st Cir. 2006).
34 Id. at 118.
an arrest involving a member of a drug orga-
nization with multiple constituents, not all of
whom had been accounted for, who were likely
to be armed, as Winston was, in a setting which
presented an opportunity for ambush or similar
violent conduct against the arresting officers."
On the other hand, in United States .
Moran Vargas, the Second Circuit concluded
there was no objective basis, nor evidence of
subjective fear, when it found that an agent's
testimony alone was not sufficient to amount to
articulable facts that would lead a "reasonably
prudent officer" to believe that a dangerous in-
dividual was hiding in the bathroom.6 In ad-
dressing reasonable belief, in Perkins . United
States, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stat-
ed, "[i]n the fifteen years since Buie, this circuit
has had several opportunities to apply the deci-
sion. And in each instance that the officers had
a reasonable belief that another person (besides
the seized individual) was on the premises and
posed a threat to the officers who were mak-
ing the arrest the court has upheld a protec-
tive sweep incident to the arrest."" An earlier
decision by that circuit suppressed evidence
located during a protective sweep, stating there
was no specific basis to believe anyone else was
in the house." Along these same lines, United
States . Johnson, the Seventh Circuit reminded
lower courts and law enforcement officers that
"although the Supreme Court has found excep-
tions to the warrant requirement in a number
of compelling situations, it has never deviated
from the rule that generalized suspicion alone
is not enough to justify a warrantless search
of a home, or a seizure of a person incident to
such a search.""1
35 Id. at 120.
36 376 E3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 2004).
37 127 E App'x 830, 834 (6th Cir. 2005).
38 See United States v. Akwari, 920 F.2d 418, 420 (6th
Cir. 1990) (holding a protective sweep of a residence was
improper because officers faced no resistance when entering,
received no threats after arrests were made, and heard no
voices or noises after arrests indicating any potential danger).
39 170 E3d 708, 710 (7th Cir. 1999).
62 Washington College of Law Fall 2013
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III. Arrests
Buie identifies two types of warrantless
protective sweeps of a residence that are con-
stitutionally permissible immediately follow-
ing an arrest.40 The first type allows officers to
"look in closets and other spaces immediately
adjoining the place of arrest from which an at-
tack could be immediately launched."41 The
second type of sweep goes 'beyond' immedi-
ately adjoining areas, but is confined to 'such
a protective sweep aimed at protecting the ar-
resting officers.' While the first type of sweep
requires no probable cause or reasonable sus-
picion, the second requires "'articulable facts
which, taken together with the rational infer-
ences from the facts, would warrant a reason-
ably prudent officer in believing that the area
to be swept harbors an individual posing a dan-
ger to those on the arrest scene."'42 The Tenth
Circuit noted, "Buie applies to both protective
searches and protective detentions because
the Court's reasoning in Buie supports treat-
ing protective sweeps and protective detention
similarly." 4
A. Closets and Spaces
Courts have struggled with allowing of-
ficers to justify "protective sweeps" in certain
spaces. A common issue among many circuits is
the search between the mattress and box spring
of a bed. "It may well be that during the course
of an otherwise justified protective sweep for a
dangerous individual, thought to be hiding, the
Fourth Amendment permits a simultaneously
conducted limited search of places which might
contain a weapon readily accessible to that as-
yet-undiscovered individual."44 Police officers
escorted the defendant through his house to
his bedroom so he could get dressed. A quick
sweep of the bed and closet, along with a look
40 United States v. Archibald, 589 E3d 289, 295 (6th
Cir. 2009).
41 Archibald, 589 F.3d at 295 (citing Maryland v. Buie,
494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990)).
42 Id.
43 United States v. Maddox, 388 F.3d 1356, 1362 (10th
Cir. 2004).
44 Crooker v. Metallo, 5 E3d 583, 585 (1st Cir. 1993).
Criminal Law Practitioner A
into an unlocked cabinet on the top shelf of
the closet, resulted in the court eschewing the
application of Buie: "The cabinet searched was
too small to accommodate a person."'4 Having
declined to authorize the search pursuant to
the "protective sweep" exception, the First Cir-
cuit proceeded to analyze the search under the
search incident to arrest doctrine.46
In the Second Circuit, however, in Unit-
edStates . Blue,4 when officers looked between
the mattress and box spring, the court found
that because it was within the immediate reach
of the defendant, such a search was permissi-
ble.4s An earlier case in the Second Circuit fo-
cused on two questions when addressing this
issue: "one, whether the search was 'properly
limited;' and two, whether it was reasonable
for the deputy marshal to conclude that [the
suspect] posed a danger to those on the arrest
scene." 4 The court reasoned that the deputy
marshal could search the immediate area to
"'neutralize the threat of physical harm' by de-
termining whether there were weapons within
[the suspect's] reach.""
In two unpublished opinions, the
Fourth Circuit approved the search of a bed-
room closet after an in-house arrest, but cau-
tioned, "that is not to say, however that Buie
condones a top-to-bottom search of a private
residence simply because law enforcement of-
ficers have carried out a valid custodial arrest
on the premises."51 In a more recent decision,
the Fourth Circuit accepted the testimony of a
deputy United States marshal, and found it an
objectively reasonable action for the deputy to
45 United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 50 (1st Cir.
2007).
46 See id. (referring to Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969)).
47 United States v. Blue, 78 E3d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 1996).
48 Id. at 60 (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763) (defining
the within the immediate reach to mean "the area from within
which [the defendant] might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence").
49 United States v. Hernandez, 941 F.2d 133, 136 (2d Cir.
1991).
50 Id. at 137.
51 United States v. Pettiford, No. 94-5391, 1995 WL
151863, at *3 (4th Cir. Apr. 7, 1995).
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search a bedroom where he had previously dis-
covered an individual hiding under a mattress.5
Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit has
found that an agent was justified in looking in
a bedroom immediately adjoining the place of
arrest.' The agent's subjective intentions are
not relevant as long as the protective sweep was
objectively reasonable.5
In 2005, the Second Circuit was present-
ed with the question whether a Buie protective
sweep may be conducted when officers are law-
fully present in a home for a reason other than
the in-home execution of an arrest warrant.
The court, in applying Buie held:
[A] law enforcement officer present
in a home under lawful process, such
as an order permitting or directing
the officer to enter for the purpose
of protecting a third party, may con-
duct a protective sweep when the
officer possesses 'articulable facts
which, taken together with the ratio-
nal inferences from the facts, would
warrant a reasonably pnident officer
in believing that the area to be swept
harbors an individual posing a dan-
ger to those on the ... scene. 6
In a commonsense approach the court
stated, "The restriction of the protective sweep
doctrine only to circumstances involving ar-
rests would jeopardize the safety of officers
in contravention of the pragmatic concept
of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth
Amendment."',
52 United States v. Williamson, 250 F. App'x 532, 533
(4th Cir. 2007).
53 See United States v. Ford, 56 F.3d 265, 266 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (stating that a sweep of the bedroom immediately
adjoining the hallway where the defendant was arrested was
permitted, but only items in plain view could be seized).
54 See United States v. Lawlor, 406 F.3d 37, 43 n.8 (1st
Cir. 2005) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813
(1996) (holding that an officer's subjective belief is irrelevant to
Fourth Amendment analysis)).
55 See United States v. Miller, 430 F.3d 93, 94-95
(2d Cir. 1995) (considering whether an officer, lawfully at
defendant's apartment to execute a protective order issued to
his roommate, could sweep defendant's bedroom).
56 Id. at 98.
57 Miller, 430 F.3d at 100.
Having said this, the question of con-
sent leading to subsequent sweeps also found
its way to the Second Circuit. In United States
v. Gandia, the defendant gave consent to offi-
cers to enter a kitchen. As the officers entered
the area, they looked into the living room and
observed a bullet. In response, they conducted
a protective sweep prior to placing the defen-
dant under arrest.8 The Southern District of
New York held, "limited pre-arrest protective
sweeps of a home for officer safety are lawful
where there are specific articulable facts sup-
porting a reasonable suspicion of risk to the
officers' safety." The circuit court then re-
manded the case to the district court to decide
the issue of consent,60 warning the trial court
that "generously construing Buie will enable
and encourage officers to obtain that consent
as a pretext for conducting a warrantless search
of the home."6 The Sixth Circuit approved a
search of an upstairs area where the defendant
was observed coming from the upstairs and fol-
lowed by his son from upstairs shortly thereaf-
ter.62
Analogizing Terry, the Eighth Circuit
found that "since an officer approaching a sus-
pected drug trafficker in the open is justified in
conducting a Terry stop and frisk out of con-
cern that the suspect may resort to violence to
thwart the encounter, it follows that an officer
arresting a suspected drug trafficker in one
room of a multi-room residence is justified in
conducting a Buie sweep out of concern that
there could be individuals lurking in the other
rooms who may resort to violence to thwart the
58 United States v. Gandia, 424 F.3d 255, 259 (2d Cir.
2005).
59 Id. at 260 (citing United States v. Gandia, No. S1 03
Cr. 1503, 2004 WL 1396164 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2004)).
60 Gandia, 424 F.3d at 265.
61 Id. at 262.
62 United States v. Stover, 474 F.3d 904, 910-11 (6th
Cir. 2007). But see United States v. Waldner, 425 F.3d 514, 517
(8th Cir. 2005) (finding no need for officers to search where
officers had accompanied a husband to his home to retrieve his
belongings and positioned themselves between the man and
his in-house office).
64 Washington College of Law Fall 2013
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arrest."63 The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand,
only finds protective sweeps valid when per-
formed incident to an arrest.64
B. Arrest Outside the Home
Although Buie addresses an in-home
arrest and protective sweep, various federal
circuits have been presented with situations
where the arrest took place outside of the home
followed by a protective sweep inside the home.
The First Circuit took a pragmatic approach to
this predicament: "an arrest that occurs just
outside the home can pose an equally serious
threat to arresting officers as one that occurs
in the home." 65 In similar fashion, the Second
Circuit approved a sweep of an apartment fol-
lowing the arrest of the suspect just outside.66
In Sharrar .Felsing, a Third Circuit case, all in-
dividuals were arrested outside the home, and
the police had no information that was anyone
else in the home; the court declined to limit
Buie sweeps to in home arrests, but found that
the standard was not met in this case.61 The
Fifth Circuit upheld a protective sweep of the
home after an arrest on a porch outside the
home occurred.68 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit
approved a protective sweep of a motel room
after an arrest in a parking lot outside of the
63 United States v. Cash, 378 F.3d 745, 749 (8th Cir.
2004).
64 See United States v. Garza, 125 E App'x 927, 931
(10th Cir. 2005) (holding officers' sweep of a hotel bathroom
improper because it was not executed incident to an arrest and
because officers had no reasonable belief that the bathroom
contained individuals posing danger to anyone).
65 United States v. Lawlor, 406 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir.
2005).
66 See United States v. Oguns, 921 E2d 442, 446-47
(2d Cir. 1990) (holding officers' sweep of an apartment valid
following an arrest outside the apartment because officers had
a reasonable belief that individuals posing an immediate threat
were inside).
67 Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 825 (3d Cir. 1997)
(concluding the standard was not met and reasoned, "[w]e
see no reason to impose a bright line rule limiting protective
sweeps to in-home arrests. . . " but acknowledged that they
"must consider whether there was an articulable basis for a
protective sweep . . . ").




In United States 9. Davis, o an Eighth Cir-
cuit case, a team of officers entered the front
door as the defendant was exiting the rear door.
As the defendant was exiting, he was placed un-
der arrest. 1 Officers did a protective sweep of
the home and the barn, a building that did not
adjoin the house. Because the officers had ob-
served Davis make two trips between the house
and the barn located approximately 100 yards
apart, the court upheld the protective sweep of
the barn.12 Though "the barn did not immedi-
ately adjoin the area of arrest, the barn was not
so far removed from the house that a reason-
able prudent officer could dismiss the potential
danger."
In a 2006 Ninth Circuit case, the facts
presented a situation with the police observing
the defendant exiting the establishment with
a brown bag. He then reentered the build-
ing. Two people then exited the building, and
shortly thereafter the defendant exited without
the bag. The police had observed the defen-
dant when he reentered the building and saw
him pause, take the bag off his shoulder and
put it down. Police conducted a protective
sweep.71 Citing an earlier decision from that
circuit (that predates Buie) which upheld a pro-
tective sweep of the interior of a house when
an arrest had been made outside of the house,
the court reasoned that "'[a] bullet fired at an
arresting officer standing outside a window
is as deadly as one that is projected from one
room to another."' "6 In dicta, the court, concur-
ring with other circuits, stated, "[T]he location
69 United States v. Biggs, 70 E3d 913, 914 (6th Cir.
1995); see also United States v. Colbert, 76 E3d, 773, 778 (6th
Cir. 1996).
70 See United States v. Davis, 471 F.3d 938 (8th Cir.
2006).
71 Id. at 942.
72 Id. at 941-42.
73 Id. at 945.
74 United States v. Paopao, 465 E3d 404, 407 (9th Cir.
2006), amended, 469 F.3d 760 (9th Cir 2006).
75 See generally United States v. Hoyos, 892 E2d 1387
(9th Cir. 1989).
76 Paopao, 465 F.3d at 409 (quoting Hoyos, 892 F.2d at
1397).
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of the arrest, inside or outside the premises,
should only bear on the question of whether
the officers had a justifiable concern for their
safety."
Four years later, in United States .
Lemus, " the Ninth Circuit denied a request for
an en banc hearing. In Lemus, an arrest had
occurred just outside the home. The defendant
attempted to return inside and was arrested be-
fore fully entering the home, and a sweep was
done of the home, which the court upheld.-'9 In
a strongly worded dissent, Chief Judge Koz-
inski wrote, "The panel says the police could
enter the house-with no suspicion whatsoever-
because Lemus's living room 'immediately ad-
joined' the place surrounding the arrest, but
Buie only authorizes a suspicion-less search
when the police make an 'in-house-arrest' (and
then only for a small area near the arrest, not
a grand tour of the entire apartment)."o Chief
Judge Kozinski continued:
The Buie exception is particularly
toxic to Fourth Amendment values
because it permits a search with zero
individualized suspicion-with noth-
ing at all but the presumption that
the home is a dangerous place for
the police. This is a fair presump-
tion if the police are already inside
the home and exposed to danger.
But to use the exception as a wedge
for entering the home turns Buie in-
side out.1
The dissent notes Lemus should be distin-
guished from United States 9. Paopao, another
case in which the court dealt with an arrest
made outside the home, by noting that in
Paopao the court upheld a sweep of the home
"only because the officers had 'a reasonable
suspicion of danger.'"2
A Tenth Circuit opinion, in UnitedStates
77 Paopao, 465 E3d at 410.
78 United States v. Lemus, 596 E3d 512 (9th Cir. 2010).
79 Id. at 514 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 515.
82 Id.
. Maddox, differs from the aforementioned cas-
es as it does not expressly limit the protective
sweep areas within the home, and further the
court concluded "that it is proper to consider.
. . reasonable threats posed to ... officers when
drawing the boundaries of the arrest scene in
an individual case."," Additionally, in the Elev-
enth Circuit, the court found appropriate the
sweep of a house conducted once the suspect
had been ordered outside and was placed un-
der arrest. 4
In a doorway threshold situation, the
District of Columbia Circuit also declined
to narrowly define the place of arrest stating,
"merely in order to avoid permitting the police
to sweep the entirety of a small apartment. The
safety of the officers, not the percentage of the
home searched, is the relevant criterion."115 The
same circuit opined, "Although Buie concerned
an arrest made in the home, the principles
enunciated by the Supreme Court are fully ap-
plicable where, as here, the arrest takes place
just outside the residence."6 The court went
on to explain that the officers' exact location,
whether in or outside of a home at the time of
arrest, does not change the nature of the appro-
priate inquiry, which is: "Did articulable facts
exist that would lead a reasonably prudent of-
ficer to believe a sweep was required to protect
the safety of those on the arrest scene?",
WI Exigency
"It is well established that 'exigent cir-
cumstances,' including the need to prevent the
destruction of evidence, permit police officers
to conduct an otherwise permissible search
83 388 E3d 1356, 1363 (10th Cir. 2004) (involving
a situation where federal marshals and local deputies were
executing an arrest warrant, Maddox, as well as approximately
four others, arrived at the house while law enforcement officers
were inside the residence; Maddox's actions warranted his pat
down by the officers).
84 See generally United States v. Kimmons, 965 E2d
1001 (11th Cir. 1992).
85 United States v. Thomas, 429 E3d 282, 287 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
86 United States v. Henry, 48 E3d 1282, 1284 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
87 Id.
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without first obtaining a warrant.""" However,
although exigent circumstances may justify a
warrantless probable cause entry into the home,
they will not do so if 'the exigent circumstances
were manufactured by the agents."'11 United
States . Hassock is the most recent Federal ap-
pellate decision to examine Buie. 90 An inter-
agency task force received information that an
individual had a semiautomatic handgun at a
specific address in the Bronx. Task force mem-
bers went to the apartment to conduct a "knock
and talk" to interview the resident in order to
obtain information regarding the person they
were seeking. A woman answered the door
who stated, in response to an agent's question,
that she did not know if anyone else was in the
residence. Agents asked to look around and
the woman consented. In a bedroom, beneath
a bed, the agent recovered a .380 caliber pistol.
At the suppression hearing, the govern-
ment argued the task force members were con-
ducting a lawful protective sweep pursuant to
Buie.91 In granting the defendant's Motion to
Suppress, the district court observed, "by mak-
ing a voluntary decision to enter the [a]part-
ment ... the task force put themselves at risk of
the very danger that necessitated the protective
sweep."92 The government based its appeal on
the holding in Buie. In reaching its holding, the
Second Circuit made a thorough examination
of its sister circuits. - The Court concluded:
[T]he agents here had no legal pro-
cess and, although they went to the
Hassock apartment with a legitimate
purpose the questioning and possi-
ble arrest of Hassock when Hassock
did not answer the door, that purpose
could not be pursued until Hassock
was found. Under these circum-
stances, the sweep cannot be viewed
as a reasonable security measure
88 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1853-54 (2011).
89 United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 590 (5th Cir.
2004).
90 United States v. Hassock, 631 F.3d 79 (2011).
91 Id. at 80-83.
92 Id. at 83-84 (quoting United States v. Hassock, 676 E
Supp. 2d 154, 161-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).
93 Hassock, 631 E3d at 89.
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incident to Hassock's interrogation
or arrest. Instead, the 'sweep' itself
became the purpose for the agents'
continued presence on the premises
insofar as they thereby searched the
location for Hassock.9 4
The Fifth Circuit "has created a non-
exhaustive five-factor list to determine whether
exigent circumstances exist: one, the degree of
urgency involved and the amount of time nec-
essary to obtain a warrant; two, the reasonable
belief that contraband is about to be removed;
three, the possibility of danger to the police
officers guarding the site of contraband while
a search warrant is sought; four, the informa-
tion indicating that the possessors of the con-
traband are aware that the police are on their
trail; and five, the ready destructibility of the
contraband and knowledge that efforts to dis-
pose of it and to escape are characteristics in
which those trafficking in contraband generally
engage.",9'
V Conclusion
"The legality of the protective sweep is
a difficult question. It requires balancing two
deeply important interests the lives of law en-
forcement officers and the constitutional right
of the people to be secure in their homes un-
der the Fourth Amendment."96 Courts remain
concerned with the physical well being of of-
ficers placed in harm's way. "On the Govern-
ment's side of the balance, we have the sub-
stantial and important interest in preserving
officer safety."" "[P]hysical entry of the home
is the chief evil against which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed.""1 The Buie
decision, which created the "protective sweep"
exception to the Fourth Amendment, is alive,
94 Id. at 88.
95 United States v. Mata, 517 E3d 279, 287 (5th Cir.
2008) (citing United States v. Gomez-Moreno, 494 E3d 350,
354-55 (5th Cir 2007)).
96 United States v. Delancy, 502 E3d 1297, 1307 (11th
Cir. 2007).
97 United States v. Enslin, 327 F.3d 788, 796 (9th Cir.
2003).
98 United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 583 (5th Cir.
2004) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980)).
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well, and thriving. Federal Circuit Courts have
not dismantled Buie, but rather expanded the
practicality of its holding for law enforcement
officers with articulated reasonable suspicion.
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